

tion was on the direct road to Brussels, and there were no fortified works to impede his progress, while from the nature of the country his numerous and excellent cavalry could be employed with great effect.¹

In the French accounts Marshal Key was much blamed for not occupying Quatre Bras with the whole of his force on the evening of the 15th. "Ney might probably have driven back the Nassau troops at Quatre Bras, and occupied that important position, but hearing a heavy cannonade on his right flank, where General Zieten had taken up his position, he thought it necessary to halt and detach a division in the direction of Eleurus. He was severely censured by Napoleon for not having literally followed his orders and pushed on to Quatre Bras."² This accusation forms a curious contrast with that made against Grouchy, upon whom Napoleon threw the blame of the defeat at Waterloo, because he strictly fulfilled his orders, by pressing the Prussians at Wavre, unheeding the cannonade on his left, which might have led him to conjecture that the more important contest between the Emperor and Wellington was at that moment raging.

himself to be secure on the point of espionage, and expected to hear immediately from Paris everything indicating a raid against the Netherlands. Napoleon seems also to have let his plan be known or divined. Mattieu Dumas (tome iii. p. 571) says that Carnot, then Minister of the Interior, told him when Napoleon started for the army that the Emperor intended to throw himself between the Prussian and English armies, and that the Prussians were most likely to be first attacked. Such knowledge soon spreads.

¹ A convenient statement of the strength of the different armies in 1815 will be found at pp. 8, 9, and 20 of Dorse?/ *Gardner*. Roughly speaking we may say that Napoleon, with a strength of about 206,000 men in June, which might have been in time increased to 327,000, had to be prepared for an attack by an allied force of 731,000 men. If we take the armies which actually fought in the Waterloo Campaign, Napoleon was still outnumbered. Fortunately there is not much question about the strength of the three forces. Wellington had almost 106,000 men, including Germans, Dutch, and *les braves Belges*; Blücher had nearly 117,000, making a grand total of 223,000. Against this force Napoleon only had 122,000 or 123,000 men. The courteous civilian reader will pardon being reminded that it is by these numbers the performances of Wellington and Blucher must be judged. There is no special merit in the general who, having superior numbers, brings superior numbers to bear. It is the commander who, having equal or inferior numbers, manages to bring superior numbers on the decisive point who is to be praised. Wellington was so much inferior in strength to Napoleon at Waterloo because he had placed 18,000 men at Halle, where, as a matter of fact, they were useless. The absence of this force reflects credit on the men, not on the General who won

Waterloo. If we blame Napoleon for the absence of
D'Erlon from Ligny
and of Grouchy from Waterloo, we must remember the
force at Halle.
² Captain Pringle.